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Abstract
Networks such as organizational network of a global company play an important
role in a variety of knowledge management and information diffusion tasks. The nodes
in these networks correspond to individuals who are self-interested. The topology of
these networks often plays a crucial role in deciding the ease and speed with which
certain tasks can be accomplished using these networks. Consequently, growing a
stable network having a certain topology is of interest. Motivated by this, we study
the following important problem: given a certain desired network topology, under
what conditions would best response (link addition/deletion) strategies played by self-
interested agents lead to formation of a pairwise stable network with only that topology.
We study this interesting reverse engineering problem by proposing a natural model
of recursive network formation. In this model, nodes enter the network sequentially
and the utility of a node captures principal determinants of network formation, namely
(1) benefits from immediate neighbors, (2) costs of maintaining links with immediate
neighbors, (3) benefits from indirect neighbors, (4) bridging benefits, and (5) network
entry fee. Based on this model, we analyze relevant network topologies such as star
graph, complete graph, bipartite Tura´n graph, and multiple stars with interconnected
centers, and derive a set of sufficient conditions under which these topologies emerge
as pairwise stable networks. We also study the social welfare properties of the above
topologies.
Keywords: Social Networks, Network Formation, Game Theory, Pairwise Stability, Net-
work Topology.
1 Introduction
A primary reason for networks such as social networks to be formed is that every person
or node gets certain benefits from the network and these benefits take different forms in
different types of networks. However, these benefits do not come for free. Every node in
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the network has to pay a certain cost for maintaining links with its immediate neighbors or
direct friends. This cost takes the form of time, money, or effort depending on the type of
network. Owing to the tension between benefits and costs, self-interested or rational nodes
think strategically while choosing their immediate neighbors. A stable network that forms
out of this process will have a topological structure as dictated by the individual utilities
and best response strategies of the nodes.
Often, stakeholders such as a social network owner or a social planner, who work with the
networks so formed, would like the network to have a certain desirable topology to facilitate
efficient handling of knowledge management, information retrieval, and information diffusion
tasks using the network. Typical examples of these tasks include enabling optimal commu-
nication among nodes for maximum efficiency (knowledge management), extracting certain
critical information from the nodes (information retrieval), broadcasting some information
to the nodes (information diffusion), etc. If a particular topology is the most appropriate for
the set of tasks to be handled, it would be useful to orchestrate network formation in a way
that the required topology emerges as a stable network as a result of the network formation
process.
A network in the current context can be naturally represented as a graph consisting of
self-interested agents called nodes and connections or friendships called links. Our analysis
in this paper is based on the equilibrium notion of pairwise stability which takes into account
bilateral deviations arising from mutual agreement of link creation between two nodes, that
Nash equilibrium fails to capture [7]. Deletion is unilateral and a node can delete a link
without consent from the other node. We recall the definition of pairwise stability from the
literature. Let uj(g) denote the utility that node j gets when the network formed is g.
Definition 1 [7] A network is said to be pairwise stable if it is a best response for a node
not to delete any of its links and there is no incentive for any two unconnected nodes to
create a link between them. So g is pairwise stable if
(a) for each edge e = (i, j) ∈ g, ui(g\{e}) ≤ ui(g) and uj(g\{e}) ≤ uj(g), and
(b) for each edge e′ = (i, j) /∈ g, if ui(g ∪ {e
′}) > ui(g), then uj(g ∪ e
′) < uj(g).
We also recall another important property, namely, efficiency.
Definition 2 [7] A network is said to be efficient if the sum of the utilities of the nodes in
the network is maximal. So g is efficient if it maximizes
∑
j∈N uj(g), that is, for all networks
g′ on N ,
∑
j∈N uj(g) ≥
∑
j∈N uj(g
′).
We consider that all nodes are homogeneous and they have global knowledge of the
network.
1.1 Motivation
One of the key problems addressed in the literature on social network formation is: given a
set of self-interested nodes and a model of social network formation, which topologies would
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be stable and which would be efficient. The trade-off between stability and efficiency is a
key topic of interest and concern in the literature on network formation.
In this paper, our focus is on the inverse problem, namely, given a certain desired net-
work topology, under what conditions would best response (link addition/deletion) strategies
played by self-interested agents lead to formation of a stable (and perhaps efficient) network
with that topology. The problem becomes important because networks such as organizational
network of a global company play an important role in a variety of knowledge management,
information retrieval, and information diffusion tasks. The topology of these networks is
one of the major factors that decides the ease and speed with which the above tasks can be
accomplished. Often, a certain topology might serve the business interests of the network
owner better. We explain this with some examples of relevant topologies shown in Figure 1.
Consider a network where there is a need to rapidly spread some crucial information. The
information may be received by any of the nodes and it is important that all other nodes
also get the information at the earliest. Also owing to the criticality of the information, it is
desirable that there are redundant ways of communication, to take care of any link failures.
In such cases, a complete network is ideal.
Consider a different scenario where the information is crucial, however there needs to be
a moderator to verify the authenticity of the information before spreading it to the other
nodes in the network (for example, it could be a rumor). Here a star network is desirable
as the center could act as a moderator and any information that originates in any part of
the network has to flow through the moderator node before it can reach other nodes in the
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Figure 1: Relevant topologies investigated in the paper
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network. Virus inoculation is a related example where a star network is desirable since only
the center needs to be inoculated in order to prevent spread of the virus to other parts of
the network, thus reducing the cost of inoculation.
Our next example concerns two communities or clusters of a society where some or all
members of a community receive certain information simultaneously. The objective here is to
forward the information to the other community. Moreover, it is desirable to not have intra-
section links to save on resources. In this case, it is desirable to have a bipartite network.
Moreover, if the information is critical and urgent, requiring redundancy, a complete bipartite
network is desirable. A bipartite Tura´n network is a practical special case where both
communities are nearly of equal sizes.
Consider a generalization of the star network, where there are multiple centers and the
leaf nodes are divided among the centers as evenly as possible. Such a network is desirable
when the number of nodes is expected to be very large and there is a need for decentralization
for efficiently controlling information in the network. We call such a network, k-star network
(see Figure 1).
It is clear that depending on the tasks for which the network is used, a certain topology
might be better than the others. This provides the motivation for our work.
1.2 Relevant Work
The modeling of strategic formation in a general network setting was first studied by Jack-
son and Wolinsky [9]. This widely cited model, however, does not capture bridging benefits.
Jackson [6] reviews several models of network formation in the literature and highlights that
pairwise stable networks may not exist in some settings. Aumann and Myerson [1] provide
a sequential move game model where nodes are far-sighted, whereas Watts [15] considers a
sequential move game model where nodes are myopic. In both of these approaches and in
any sequential network formation model in general, the resulting network is based on the
ordering in which links are altered and owing to random ordering, it is not clear which net-
works emerge. Narayanam and Narahari [12] investigate the topologies of networks formed
with a generic model of network formation based on a value function, Myerson value. Hum-
mon [5] uses agent-based simulation approaches to explore the dynamics of network evolution
based on the symmetric connections model [9]. Goyal and Vega-Redondo [4] propose a non-
cooperative game model capturing bridging benefits wherein they introduce the concept of
essential nodes, which is a part of our utility model. Doreian [3], given some conditions on
a network, analytically arrives at specific networks that are pairwise stable. However, the
complexity of analysis increases exponentially with the number of nodes and the analysis is
limited to a network with only five nodes. Some gaps in this analysis are addressed by Xie
and Cui [17], [18].
The above models of social network formation assume that all nodes are present through-
out the evolution of a network, which allows nodes to form links that may not be consistent
with the desired network. For instance, if our desired network is a star graph, with certain
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conditions on the network, a link between two nodes, of which one would play the role of
the center, is desirable. However, with the same conditions, a link between other pairs is
created with high probability, which is inconsistent with the desired star topology. Further-
more, with all nodes present in an unorganized network, a random ordering over them in
sequential network formation models adds to the complexity of analysis. However, in most
social networks, not all nodes are present from beginning itself. A network starts building
up from a few nodes and gradually grows to its capacity. Our model captures such type of
network formation.
There have been a few approaches earlier to design incentives for nodes so that the
resulting network is efficient. Woodard and Parkes [16] use mechanism design to design
incentives so that the outcome is an efficient network. Mutuswami and Winter [11] design a
mechanism that ensures efficiency, budget balance, and equity. Though it is often assumed
that the welfare of a network is based only on its efficiency, there are many situations where
this may not be true. A particular network may not be efficient in itself, but it may be
desirable for reasons external to the network, as explained in Section 1.1.
1.3 Contributions of the Paper
In this paper, we study the inverse network formation problem, namely, under what condi-
tions would a desired topology be obtained as a pairwise stable network when self-interested
agents form a network by playing best response strategies.
• First we propose a recursive model of network formation where nodes enter the network
sequentially. The entry of a new node triggers an adjustment process in the network;
this adjustment process continues until the network reaches a pairwise stable state.
With this recursive model, we can guarantee that the network retains its topology in
each of its stable states; also the analysis can be carried out independent of the current
number of nodes in the network. The utility model we propose captures many key
features: (a) benefits from immediate neighbors, (b) costs of maintaining links with
immediate neighbors, (c) benefits from indirect neighbors, (d) bridging benefits, and
(e) an entry fee for entering the network.
• With the above proposed model, we study common and important network topologies,
namely, star graph, complete graph, bipartite Tura´n graph, and k-star graph, and
derive sufficient conditions under which a pairwise stable network with the desired
topology will result under the proposed model of network formation.
• We also study the efficiency the above topologies.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first detailed effort in investigating the reverse
engineering problem of obtaining a social network with desired topology.
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Stable network
of (n-1) nodes
Network evolves until
it reaches a stable state
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    n=2
n = n+1
A new node enters
network by creating link 
with an existing node?
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Yes
Figure 2: Proposed model of network formation
2 A Recursive Model of Network Formation
We consider that a game is played amongst a set of self-interested nodes, where the objective
of each node is to maximize its profits or benefits that it gets from the network. The network
consists of n nodes at any given time, where n could vary from one to a certain maximum
number of nodes. The game starts with one node, whose only strategy is to remain in its
current state. The strategy of the second node is to either (a) not enter the network or
(b) form a link with the first node. We make an intuitive assumption that in order to be
a part of the network, the second node has to propose a link with the first node and not
vice versa. Also, for successful link creation, utility of the first node should not decrease.
The network formed with these two nodes evolves to a pairwise stable network, which in
the case of two nodes, does not result in any new network. After the network reaches a
pairwise stable state, the third node considers entering the network. This process continues,
which thus results in the formation of a pairwise stable network of n nodes. We note that,
in the process described above, no node in the network of n − 1 nodes can create a link
with the newly entering nth node until the latter successfully forms a link with one of the
existing nodes in the network. After the new node enters the network successfully, nodes
who get to make their move are chosen at random at all time and the network evolves until it
reaches a pairwise stable network consisting of n nodes. Following this, a new (n+ 1)th node
considers entering the network and the process goes on recursively. The assumption that a
node considers entering the network only when it is pairwise stable might seem artificial in
general social networks, but can be justified in organizational networks where entry of nodes
can be controlled by a network administrator. The model is depicted in Figure 2.
Each node has a set of strategies at any given time and it chooses its myopic best response
strategy which maximizes its immediate utility. A strategy can be of one of the three types,
namely (a) creating a link with a node that is not its immediate neighbor, (b) deleting a link
with an immediate neighbor, or (c) maintaining status quo. Note that a node will compute
whether a link it proposes decreases utility of the other node, because if it does, it is not
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its myopic best response as the link will not be accepted by the latter. Moreover, consistent
with the notion of pairwise stability, if a node gets to make a move and altering a link does
not strictly increase its utility, then it prefers not to alter it.
The proposed utility model, that we use for the purpose of our analysis, is described
below.
2.1 Utility Model
As nodes have global knowledge of existing nodes in the network while making their decisions,
for instance, creating a link with a faraway node, we propose a utility model that captures
the global view of both indirect and bridging benefits. Our model takes the idea of essential
nodes from the model proposed by Goyal and Vega-Redondo [4]. A node j is said to be
essential for y and z if j lies on every path that joins y and z in the network. Whenever
nodes y and z are directly connected, they get the entire benefits arising from the direct
link. On the other hand, when they are indirectly connected with the help of other nodes,
of which at least one is essential, y and z lose some fraction of the indirect benefits in the
form of intermediation rents paid to the essential nodes without whom the communication
is infeasible. Moreover, for simplicity of analysis, we assume that nodes that lie on path(s)
connecting y and z, but are not essential, do not get any share of the intermediation rents.
So, when y and z are indirectly connected with the help of other nodes of which none is
essential, they get the entire indirect benefits arising from their connection with each other.
In order to avoid discrete constraints on rents, such as summation of the fractions paid to
be less than one, we assume that irrespective of the number of essential nodes connecting y
and z, they lose the same fraction.
We now describe the determinants of network formation that our model captures, and
thus obtain expression for the utility function. Table 1 enlists the notation we use in the
rest of the paper.
2.1.1 Network Entry Fee
Since nodes enter a network one by one, we introduce a notion of network entry fee. This fee
corresponds to some cost a node has to bear in order to be a part of the network. It is clear
that, if a newly entering node wants its first connection to be with an existing node which
is of high importance or degree, then it has to spend more time or effort. So the entry fee
that the former pays is assumed to be an increasing function of the degree of the latter, say
dT. For simplicity of analysis, we assume the fee to be directly proportional to dT and call
the proportionality constant, network entry factor c0.
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uj net utility that node j gets from the network
N set of nodes present in the network
dj degree of node j
bi benefits obtained from a node at distance i in absence of rents
c costs incurred in maintaining link with an immediate neighbor
l(j, w) distance between nodes j and w
γ fraction of indirect benefits paid to the corresponding set of essential nodes
E(j, w) set of nodes essential to connect j and w
e(j, w) |E(j, w)|
c0 network entry factor (see Network Entry Fee)
T(j) target node to which node j connects to enter the network
I{j=NE} 1 when j is a newly entering node about to create its first link, else it is 0
Table 1: Notation for the proposed utility model
2.1.2 Direct Benefits
These benefits are obtained from immediate neighbors in a network. For a node j, these
benefits equal b1 times dj .
2.1.3 Link Costs
These costs are the amount of resources like time, money, and effort a node has to spend
in order to maintain links with its immediate neighbors. For a node j, these costs equal c
times dj.
2.1.4 Indirect Benefits
These benefits are obtained from indirect neighbors or indirect friends and these decay with
distance, that is bi+1 < bi. In the absence of rents, the total indirect benefits that a node j
gets is
∑
w∈N, l(j,w)>1 bl(j,w).
2.1.5 Intermediation Rents
Nodes pay a fraction γ (0 ≤ γ < 1) of the indirect benefits, in the form of additional favors or
monetary transfers to the corresponding set of essential nodes, if any, and the loss incurred
by a node j due to these rents is
∑
w∈N, E(j,w)6=φ γbl(j,w).
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2.1.6 Bridging Benefits
In our model, a node gets bridging benefits for enabling communication between pairs of
nodes which are otherwise disconnected. Two nodes pay a fraction γ of the indirect benefits
to the set of essential nodes connecting them, which is assumed to be equally divided among
the essential nodes connecting that pair. Let a node j be one of the essential nodes connecting
two nodes y and z. Both y and z benefit bl(y,z) each and so the connection produces a total
benefit of 2bl(y,z). Each node from the set E(y, z) gets a fraction
γ
e(y,z)
, the actual benefits
being
(
γ
e(y,z)
)
2bl(y,z). So the bridging benefits obtained by a node j from the entire network
is
∑
y,z∈N, j∈E(y,z)
(
γ
e(y,z)
)
2bl(y,z).
2.1.7 Utility Function
For a node j, the utility function is a function of the network, that is uj : g → R. We drop
the notation g from the following equation for readability. Summing up all the determinants
of network formation that our model captures, the utility function for node j is given by
uj = −c0dT(j)I{j=NE}+dj(b1−c)+
∑
w∈N
l(j,w)>1
bl(j,w)−
∑
w∈N
E(j,w)6=φ
γbl(j,w)+
∑
y,z∈N
j∈E(y,z)
(
γ
e(y, z)
)
2bl(y,z) (1)
2.2 Dynamics of Network Formation
The proposed model of network formation is based on a sequential move game and hence
can be represented as an extensive form game tree. A snapshot of one such game tree is
shown in Figure 3.
2.2.1 Game Tree
As the entry of each node in the network results in one game tree, the network formation
process results in a series of game trees. Each node of a game tree (not to be confused with
a node of the network) represents a network state, while each branch represents a possible
transition from a network state, owing to decision made by a node. So, the root of a game
tree represents the network state in which a new node is considering to enter the network.
A general way to find an equilibrium in an extensive form game is to use backward
induction [13]. Our game is a special case of such a game where the players have bounded
rationality, that is their best response strategies are myopic. So instead of the regular
backward induction approach or the bottom-up approach, we take a top-down approach,
which results in derivation of the same set of conditions under which a network topology
gets formed. An improving path is a sequence of networks, where each transition is obtained
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by either two nodes choosing to add a link or one node choosing to delete a link. Thus, a
pairwise stable network is one from which there is no improving path leaving it [8]. The notion
of improving paths is a myopic one, and agents make their decisions of altering links without
considering how their actions affect the decisions of other nodes and hence the evolution
of network. Though this process of improving paths exhibits bounded rationality, it is a
natural variation on best response dynamics and has some experimental justifications [14].
So, deriving using the top-down approach leads to an intuitive understanding of the dynamics
of network formation using the notion of improving paths.
2.2.2 Notion of Types
As the order in which nodes take decision, is random, in a general game, the number of
branches arising from each state in the game tree depends on the number of possible con-
nections a node can be involved in (or number of possible connections with respect to a
node). We say two nodes, say A and C, of a graph g are of the same type if there exists
an automorphism f : V (g) → V (g) such that f(A) = C, where V (g) is the vertex set of g.
The implication of nodes being of the same type is that, for any automorphism f , if the best
response strategy of node A is to alter its link with node D, then the best response strategy
of f(A) is to alter its link with f(D). So at any point in time, it is sufficient to consider the
best response strategies of one node of each type. We say two connections with respect to
a node B, say with nodes A and C, are of the same type if there exists an automorphism f
such that f(A) = C and f(B) = B. The implication of connections being of the same type
with respect to a node is that, the node is indifferent between the connections, irrespective
of the utility model. Different types of connections with respect to a node form different
branches in the game tree.
For example, in Figure 1(e), nodes G and H are of the same type. Also, the two possible
connections MG and MH with respect to node M , are of the same type. But the possible
connections EG and EH with respect to node E, are not of the same type. So, these two
strategies of node E, namely, connecting with nodes G and H , form different branches in
the game tree, implying that the utilities arising from these two types of connections are
not necessarily equal. In a network formation game with homogeneous nodes, the number
of branches depends on the number of different types of possible connections with respect
to a node, at that particular instant. Furthermore, as social networks inherently have low
diameter [10] and we are primarily interested in the formation of special topologies in a
recursive manner (nodes are already organized according to the topology and the objective
is to extend the topology to one more node, so the existing nodes play the same role as
before, and most or all of the existing links do not change), the number of different types
of nodes, as well as the number of different types of possible connections with respect to a
node, at any instant, is a small constant, thus simplifying the analysis.
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2.2.3 Directing the Dynamics
The procedure for deriving sufficient conditions for the formation of a given topology is
similar to mathematical induction. Consider a base case network with very few nodes (two
in our analysis). We derive conditions so that the network formed with these few nodes has
the desired topology. Then using induction, we assume that a network with n − 1 nodes
has the desired topology, and derive conditions so that, the network with n nodes, also has
that topology. Without loss of generality, we explain this procedure with the example of star
topology, referring to Figure 3. We derive conditions for base case in the proof of Theorem 1.
Node creating or deleting a link
Node with whom link is altered
Link being deleted
Link being created
Other nodes
Other links
Desired improving path
Undesired path
state 2state 1
state 0
state 3 state 4 state 5
A
C
B
D E
F
C
B
D E
F
A
A
B
D E
FC
A
C
B
D E
F C
B
D E
F
A A
C
B
D E
F
Figure 3: Directing the Dynamics of Star Formation
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Now assuming that the network formed with n− 1 nodes is a star, we derive conditions so
that the network of n nodes is also a star.
In Figure 3, node A is the newly entering node and the network is currently in state 0
where a star with n− 1 nodes is already formed. Note that in state 0, with respect to node
A, there are two types of possible connections: (a) with the center and (b) with a leaf node.
In states 1, 3, 4 and 5, there are two types of nodes, and two types of possible connections
with respect to a leaf node and one with respect to the center. It will be seen that, the
network is directed to not enter state 2, so even though there are four different types of
nodes, it is not a matter of concern. Firstly, we want node A to connect to the center and
enter state 1 by choosing the improving path that transits the network from state 0 to state
1 in Figure 3. So utility of node A in state 1 should be greater than that in state 0, that
is uA(1) > uA(0), where u is any utility function, Equation (1) being one such function.
Similarly, for node B to accept the link from node A, B’s utility should not decrease, that
is uB(1) ≥ uB(0). Also we do not want node A to connect to any of the leaf nodes, that
is, we do not want the network to enter state 2. Note that there might be an improving
path from state 2 that eventually results in a star, but as we are concerned with sufficient
conditions, we discard state 2 in order to shorten the analysis. One way to ensure that the
network does not enter state 2, irrespective of whether it lies on an improving path, is by
making it less favorable for node A than the desired state 1. That is, starting from state 0,
there exists an alternative improving path which gives node A better utility than entering
state 2. We say that, for node A, the strategy of creating a link with any of the leaf nodes is
dominated by the strategy of creating link with the center. For state 2 to be dominated by
state 1, uA(2) < uA(1). Another way to ensure the same is by having a condition for a leaf
node such that, accepting a link from node A decreases its utility and so a leaf node does
not accept the link, thus forcing node A to connect to the center, that is uj(2) < uj(0) for
j = C,D,E, F . So the network enters state 1, which is our desired state.
In order to ensure pairwise stability of our desired state, there should be no improving
paths leading out of it, for which we need to take care of two cases. First, when node B gets
to make its move, it can either (a) break any of its links and enter state 5 or (b) remain in
the same state 1. As we do not want the network to enter state 5, node B’s utility should
be at least as good remaining in state 1 as entering 5, that is uB(1) ≥ uB(5). Second,
when any of the leaf nodes is chosen at random, it can either (a) create a link with some
other leaf node and enter state 3 or (b) delete its link with the center and enter state 4, or
(c) remain in the same state 1. As we want the network to stay in state 1, the additional
conditions respectively are uj(1) ≥ uj(3) and uj(1) ≥ uj(4) for j = A,C,D,E, F . Thus we
direct the dynamics of network formation along a desired improving path by imposing a set
of conditions ensuring that the resulting network is in the desired state or has the desired
topology. In the following section, we analyze some common network topologies using our
model of recursive and sequential network formation.
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3 Sufficient Conditions for Formation of Relevant Topolo-
gies
In this section, we analyze the dynamics of formation of several relevant network topologies,
namely star, complete graph, bipartite Tura´n graph, 2-star, and k-star, and derive sufficient
conditions for their formation. Note that the conditions derived for any particular network
topology are sufficient under the given setting, and there may exist alternative conditions
that result in the same topology. We use Equation (1) for mathematically deriving the
conditions.
Theorem 1 For a given network, if b1 − b2 + γb2 ≤ c < b1 and c0 < (1− γ) (b2 − b3), the
resulting topology is a star.
Proof. Refer to Figure 3 throughout the proof. For the base case of n = 2, the requirement
for the second node to connect to the first is that its utility should become strictly positive.
Also as the first node has degree 0, there is no entry fee.
0 < b1 − c⇔ c < b1 (2)
Now, consider a star consisting of n− 1 nodes. Let the newly entering nth node get to make
a decision of whether to enter the network. For n ≥ 3, if the entering node connects to the
center, it gets indirect benefits of b2 each from n − 2 nodes. But as the center is essential
in order to connect the newly entering node with the other leaf nodes, the new node has to
pay γ fraction of these benefits to the center. Also, it has to pay an entry fee of (n− 2)c0 as
the degree of center is n− 2. So in Figure 3, uA(0) < uA(1) gives
0 < b1 − c+ (n− 2) (1− γ) b2 − (n− 2)c0
⇔ c < b1 + (n− 2) ((1− γ) b2 − c0)
As it needs to be true for all n ≥ 3, we set the condition to
c < min
n≥3
{
b1 + (n− 2) ((1− γ) b2 − c0)
}
⇐ c < b1 + (1− γ) b2 − c0 (3)
The last step is obtained so that the condition for link cost is independent of the upper limit
on the number of nodes, by enforcing
c0 ≤ (1− γ) b2 (4)
which enables us to substitute n = 3 and the condition holds for all n ≥ 3.
For the center to accept a link from the newly entering node, we need to have uB(0) ≤ uB(1).
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For n = 2, the requirement for the first node to accept link from the second node is 0 ≤ b1−c
which is satisfied by Inequality (2). For n = 3, as the center is essential for connecting the
other two nodes separated by distance two, it gets γ fraction of b2 from both the nodes. So
it gets bridging benefits of 2γb2.
b1 − c ≤ 2(b1 − c) + 2γb2
⇔ c ≤ b1 + 2γb2
This condition is satisfied by Inequality (2). For n ≥ 4, prior to entry of the new node,
the center alone connected
(
n − 2
2
)
pairs of nodes at distance two from each other, while after
connecting with the new node, the center is the sole connection for
(
n − 1
2
)
such pairs. So the
required condition:
(n− 2)(b1 − c) + γ
(
n− 2
2
)
2b2 ≤ (n− 1)(b1 − c) + γ
(
n− 1
2
)
2b2
This condition is satisfied by Inequality (2) for all n ≥ 4.
For the newly entering node to prefer the center over a leaf node as its first connection (not
applicable for n = 2 and 3), we need uA(1) > uA(2).
b1 − c+ (n− 2) (1− γ) b2 − (n− 2)c0 > b1 − c+ (1− γ) b2 + (n− 3) (1− γ) b3 − c0
⇔ c0 < (1− γ) (b2 − b3) (5)
Alternatively, the newly entering node may want to connect to the leaf node, but the leaf
node’s utility decreases. In that case, the alternative condition can be uj(2) < uj(0) for
j = C,D,E, F . Note that this leaf node gets bridging benefits of 2γb2 for being essential
in connecting the new node with the center. Also, as it is one of the two essential nodes in
connecting the new node with the other n−3 leaf nodes (the other being the center), it gets
bridging benefits of (n− 3)(γ
2
)2b3 = (n− 3)γb3.
b1 − c+ (n− 3) (1− γ) b2 > 2(b1 − c) + (n− 3) (1− γ) b2 + 2γb2 + (n− 3)γb3
which gives c > b1 + 2γb2 + (n − 3)γb3. But this is inconsistent with the condition in
Inequality (2). So in order to ensure that the newly entering node connects to the center
and not to any of the leaf nodes, we use Inequality (5) only.
Now that a star of n nodes is formed, we ensure its pairwise stability by deriving con-
ditions for the same. Firstly, we ensure that the center does not delete any of its links. So
we need uB(1) ≥ uB(5). Note that from the center’s point of view, state 5 is same as state
0 and as we have seen earlier that uB(0) ≤ uB(1), the required condition uB(4) ≤ uB(1) is
already ensured.
Next, no two leaf nodes should form a link between them. So we should ensure that, not
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creating a link between them is at least as good for them as creating, that is uj(1) ≥ uj(3)
for any leaf node j. This condition is applicable for n ≥ 3.
b1 − c+ (n− 2) (1− γ) b2 ≥ 2(b1 − c) + (n− 3) (1− γ) b2
⇔ c ≥ b1 − b2 + γb2 (6)
For a leaf node to not delete its link with the center, we need uj(1) ≥ uj(4) for any leaf node
j. For n ≥ 2, we have
b1 − c+ (n− 2) (1− γ) b2 ≥ 0
⇔ c ≤ b1 + (n− 2) (1− γ) b2
which is a weaker condition than Inequality (2) for n ≥ 2.
Note that Inequalities (2) and (5) put together are stronger than Inequalities (3) and (4)
combined. We get the required result using Inequalities (2), (5) and (6).
We provide proof of Theorem 3 in the Appendix. Proofs of Theorems 2 and 4 use similar
technique.
Theorem 2 For a network, if c < b1 − b2 and c0 ≤ (1− γ) b2, the resulting topology is a
complete graph.
Theorem 3 For a network with γ < b2−b3
3b2−b3
, if b1 − b2 + γ (3b2 − b3) < c < b1 − b3 and
(1− γ) (b2 − b3) < c0 ≤ (1− γ) b2, the resulting topology is a bipartite Tura´n graph.
Theorem 4 Let σ be the upper bound on the number of nodes that can enter the network
and λ = ⌈σ
2
− 1⌉ (2b2 − b3). Then, if (1− γ) (b2 − b3) < c0 < (1− γ) (b2 − b4) and either
(i) b2−b3
λ−b3
≤ γ < b2
λ+1
and b1 − b2 + γb2 + γλ < c < b1, or
(ii) γ < min
{
b2
λ+1
, b2−b3
λ−b3
}
and b1 − b3 + γ (b2 + b3) ≤ c < b1,
the resulting topology is a 2-star.
For arbitrarily large upper bound on the number of nodes that can enter the network,
the following corollary is immediate from the above theorem.
Corollary 1 For a network with γ = 0, if b1 − b3 ≤ c < b1 and b2 − b3 < c0 < b2 − b4, the
resulting topology is a 2-star.
3.1 Base Graph
The sufficient conditions for the formation of topologies analyzed so far, are obtained, starting
from the base graph or the starting graph consisting of a single node (corresponding to the
base case of formation of a network with n = 2). However, in case of some topologies, under
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a given utility model, the conditions required for its formation on discretely small number
of nodes, are inconsistent with that required on arbitrarily large number of nodes. Lemma 2
shows that k-star is one such topology. We provide its proof in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 Under the proposed utility model, for the entire family of k-star networks (k ≥ 3)
to be pairwise stable, it is necessary that γ = 0 and c = b1 − b3.
Proof. We consider two scenarios sufficient to prove this.
I) No center should delete its link with any other center: Here, only one case is enough to
be considered, that is, when each center has just one leaf node since in all other cases, the
benefits obtained by each center from the connection with other centers is at least as much.
For k = 3,
3(b1 − c) + 2(1− γ)b2 + γ(1)(2)2b2 +
γ
2
(1)(2)b3 ≥ 2(b1 − c) + (1− γ)b2 + (1− γ)b2
+(1− γ)b3 + γ(1)(1)2b2 +
γ
2
(1)(1)2b3
+
γ
2
(1)(1)2b3 +
γ
3
(1)(1)2b4
which gives
c ≤ b1 − b3 + γ(2b2 + b3)−
2γ
3
b4 (7)
For k ≥ 4,
(k − 1 + 1)(b1 − c) + (k − 1)(1− γ)b2 + γ(1)(k − 1)2b2 +
γ
2
(1)(k − 1)2b3
≥ (k − 2 + 1)(b1 − c) + (k − 2)(1− γ)b2 + b2 + (1− γ)b3 + γ(1)(k − 2)2b2
+
γ
2
(1)(k − 2)2b3 + γ(1)(1)2b3 +
γ
2
(1)(1)2b4
which gives
c ≤ b1 − b3 + γ(b2 − b4) (8)
II) Leaf nodes of different centers should not form a link with each other: Consider a leaf
node. Let mi be the number of leaf nodes connected to the center to which the leaf node
under consideration is connected. For k ≥ 3,
2(b1 − c) + (mi − 1)(1− γ)b2 + (1− γ)b3(
∑
j 6=i
mi − 1) + (k − 1)b2
≤ b1 − c+ (mi − 1)(1− γ)b2 + (1− γ)b3
∑
j 6=i
mi + (k − 1)(1− γ)b2
which gives
c ≥ b1 − b3 + γ((k − 1)b2 + b3) (9)
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The only way to satisfy Inequalities (7), (8) and (9) simultaneously is by setting
γ = 0 (10)
and
c = b1 − b3 (11)
Lemma 2 Under the proposed network formation and utility models, starting with a network
consisting of a single node, k-star network (k ≥ 3) cannot be formed.
Proof. From Lemma 1, the conditions necessary for the family of k-star networks to be
pairwise stable are γ = 0 and c = b1 − b3, which are sufficient conditions for the formation
of 2-star network according to Corollary 1.
The following lemma shows a result for a more general class of network formation models
with some restriction on the desired improving path.
Lemma 3 Under the proposed utility model and the class of evolution models that allow
altering at most one link at a time based on myopic best response strategies, starting with a
network consisting of a single node, one cannot find sufficient conditions for the formation of
a k-star network (k ≥ 3) by directing the evolution of a network along a shortest improving
path (where each network is obtained from the preceding network by adding a link).
Proof. It is clear from Lemma 1 that γ = 0 and c = b1 − b3 are necessary for the family of
k-star networks (k ≥ 3) to be pairwise stable. We consider three cases how a k-star network
builds.
Case (i) The first k nodes form a complete network amongst themselves first, following
which, other nodes enter, who then play the role of leaf nodes: Lemma 2 shows that a k-star
network cannot be formed if the topology is to be maintained in each pairwise stable state.
So there exist no conditions under which a k-star network will be formed. In the rest of the
cases, the centers are connected to some leaf nodes and there will eventually come a time
when two centers at distance two from each other, have to form a mutual link.
Case (ii) At least one of these two centers have no leaf node: It can be seen that, with the
necessary condition γ = 0, if c ≥ b1 − b2, no node would want to create a link with another
node which is at distance two or more from it, if all of latter’s direct neighbors, if any, are
direct neighbors of the former. So creating a link with the center (at distance two from it)
having no leaf is not beneficial for the other center as c = b1 − b3.
Case (iii) Both centers have at least one leaf node each: It can be seen that if c < b1− b4,
nodes who are at distance four or more benefit by creating a link between them. As the leaf
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nodes of these two centers are at distance four from each other, it is desirable for them to
create link between them as c = b1 − b3.
A possible and reasonable solution to overcome this problem is to analyze the network
formation process, starting from some other base graph. The base graph can be obtained by
some other method, one of which could be providing additional incentives to the nodes of
the base graph. For instance, for analyzing the formation of k-star, the base graph is taken
to be the complete network on the k centers, with the centers connecting to one leaf node
each. As the base graph consists of 2k nodes, the induction starts with the base case for
formation of k-star network with n = 2k + 1. Theorem 5 gives the sufficient conditions for
the formation of k-star network provided the network starts building itself from this base
graph. Its proof uses technique similar to that of Theorem 3.
Theorem 5 For a network starting with the base graph for k-star (k ≥ 3), and γ = 0, if
c = b1 − b3 and b2 − b3 < c0 < b2 − b4, the resulting topology is a k-star.
Proof. It is clear from Lemma 1 that under the proposed utility model, for the family of
k-star networks (k ≥ 3) to be pairwise stable, it is necessary that γ = 0, that is, we need
γ = 0 in order to arrive at all possible k-star networks for a given k, and hence forms the
necessary part of sufficient conditions for the formation of a k-star network. Hence, for the
rest of this proof, we will assume γ = 0.
Without loss of generality, assume some indexing over the k centers from 1 to k such
that any center connected to more leaf nodes has a higher index than any center connected
to less leaf nodes. Let Ci be the center with index i and mi be the number of leaf nodes it is
connected to. Also we start with a base graph in which every center is connected to one leaf
node and the number of leaf nodes connected to each center increases as the process goes
on. So we have, 1 ≤ m1 ≤ m2 ≤ · · · ≤ mk.
For the newly entering node to propose entering the network: Our objective is
to ensure that the newly entering node connects to a center with the least number of leaf
nodes in order to maintain balance over the number of leaf nodes connected to the centers.
Without loss of generality, assume that we want the newly entering node to connect to C1.
The utility of the newly entering node should be positive after doing so.
b1 − c + (m1 + k − 1) (b2 − c0) + b3
k∑
i=2
mi > 0
Since the minimum value of mi is 1 for any i, the above condition is true if
c < b1 + k (b2 − c0) + (k − 1)b3
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This is true if
c < b1 (satisfied by Equation (11))
and
c0 ≤ b2 (12)
The newly entering node should connect to a center with the least number of
leaf nodes, whenever applicable: This case does not arise when all centers have the
same number of leaf nodes. Moreover, the way we direct the evolution of the network, the
number of leaf nodes connected to any two centers differs by at most one. Without loss of
generality, assume that we want the newly entering node to connect to C1. Consider a center
Cp such that mp = m1 + 1. So the newly entering node should prefer connecting to C1 over
connecting to Cp.
b1 − c+ (m1 + k − 1) (b2 − c0) + b3
k∑
i=2
mi > b1 − c+ (mp + k − 1) (b2 − c0) + b3
∑
1≤i≤k
i 6=p
mi
As mp = m1 + 1, we have
c0 > b2 − b3 (13)
For a center with the least number of leaf nodes to accept the link from the
newly entering node: It can be easily seen that this is ensured by Equation (11).
The newly entering node should not connect to any leaf node: It can be easily seen
that owing to benefits degrading with distance, for the newly entering node, connecting to
any leaf node which is connected to a center with the most number of leaf nodes strictly
dominates connecting to any other leaf node, whenever applicable. So it is sufficient to
ensure that the newly entering node does not connect to any leaf node which is connected
to a center with the most number of leaf nodes. This can be done by ensuring that for
the newly entering node, connecting to a center with the least number of leaf nodes strictly
dominates connecting to any leaf node which is connected to a center with the most number
of leaf nodes.
b1 − c+ (m1 + k − 1)(b2 − c0) + b3
k∑
i=2
mi > b1 − c+ b2 − c0 + (mk + k − 2)b3 + b4
k−1∑
i=1
mi
We need to consider two cases (i) mk = m1 + 1 and (ii) mk = m1
Case (i) mk = m1 + 1: Substituting this value of mk gives
(m1 + k − 1)(b2 − c0) + (b3 − b4)
k−1∑
i=2
mi +m1(b3 − b4) + b3 > b2 − c0 + (m1 + k − 1)b3
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As the minimum value of
∑k−1
i=2 mi is k − 2, the above remains true if we replace
∑k−1
i=2 mi
by k − 2. Further simplification gives
(m1 + k − 2)(b2 − b4 − c0) > 0
Since m1 + k − 2 > 0 is positive, we must have
c0 < b2 − b4 (14)
Case (ii) mk = m1: It can be similarly shown that Equation (14) is the sufficient condition.
Now that the newly entering node enters in a way such that k-star network is formed, we
have to ensure that no further modifications of links occur so that the network formed thus
is pairwise stable.
For centers and the corresponding leaf nodes to not delete the link between
them: It can be easily seen that c < b1, a weaker condition than Equation (11), is a suffi-
cient condition to ensure this.
No center should delete its link with any other center: This is ensured by Inequali-
ties (7) and (8) as explained in Lemma 1.
Leaf nodes of a center should not form a link with each other: The net benefit that
a leaf node gets by forming such a link should be non-positive.
b1 − c− b2 ≤ 0
⇔ c ≥ b1 − b2
which is satisfied by Equation (11).
Leaf nodes of different centers should not form a link with each other: This is
ensured by Inequality (9) as explained in Lemma 1.
Link between a center and leaf node of other centers should not be created: Let
Ci be the center under consideration and the leaf node under consideration be connected
to Cj (j 6= i). There are two ways to ensure this. First is to ensure that a center neither
proposes nor accepts a link with a leaf node of other centers. This mathematically is
(k − 1 +mi)(b1 − c) + b2
∑
k 6=i
mk > (k − 1 +mi + 1)(b1 − c) + b2(
∑
k 6=i
mk − 1)
⇔ c > b1 − b2
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An alternative to this condition is to ensure that a leaf node neither proposes nor accepts
a link with a center to which it is not connected, but since this condition is already satisfied
by Equation (11), this alternative need not be considered.
Equations (10), (11), (12), (13) and (14) give the required sufficient conditions for the
formation of a k-star network.
3.2 Intuition Behind the Results
The network entry fee has an impact on the resulting topology as seen from the above
theorems. For instance, in Theorems 1 and 3, the intervals spanned by the values of c and
γ may intersect, but the values of network entry factor c0 span mutually exclusive intervals
separated at (1− γ)(b2 − b3). In case of star, c0 is low and a newly entering node can afford
to connect to the center, which in general, has very high degree. In case of bipartite Tura´n
graph, it is important to ensure that the sizes of the two partitions are as equal as possible.
As c0 is high, a newly entering node connects to a node with a lower degree, whenever
applicable, that is, to a node that belongs to the partition with more number of nodes, and
hence the newly entering node potentially becomes a part of the partition with fewer number
of nodes, thus maintaining a balance between sizes of the two partitions. In case of k-star,
the objective is to ensure that a newly entering node connects to a node with moderate
degree, that is, the network entry factor is not so high that a newly entering node prefers
connecting to a leaf node and also not so low that it prefers connecting to a center with
the highest degree. This intuition is clearly reflected in Theorems 4 and 5 where c0 takes
intermediate values. In general, a high value of network entry factor c0 lays the foundation
for formation of a regular graph.
It is clear that a complete network is formed when the costs of maintaining links is
extremely low, as reflected in Theorem 2. The remaining topologies are formed in the
intermediate ranges of c. From Theorems 3, 4 and 5, it can be seen that the feasibility of
a network being formed depends on the values of γ also, which arises owing to contrasting
densities of connections in a network. For instance, in a bipartite Tura´n network, nodes
from different partitions are densely connected with each other, while that from the same
partition are not connected at all. Similarly, in a k-star network, there is an extreme contrast
in the densities of connections (dense amongst centers and sparse for leaf nodes).
3.3 Connection to Efficiency
In this section, we analyze the efficiency of the concerned networks. The conditions are
sufficient and not necessary, and so there may exist other sets of conditions that result in
a given topology. We analyze the efficiency based on the assumption that the networks are
formed using the derived conditions.
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From Equation (1), the intermediation rents are transferable among the nodes, and so
do not affect the efficiency of a network. Furthermore, the network entry fee is paid by any
node at most once, and so does not account for efficiency in the long run. So the expression
for efficiency of a network is
∑
j∈N

dj(b1 − c) +
∑
w∈N
l(j,w)>1
bl(j,w)


Lemma 4 Let µ be the number of nodes in the network.
(i) If c < b1 − b2, then complete graph is uniquely efficient.
(ii) If b1 − b2 < c ≤ b1 +
(
µ−2
2
)
b2, then star is the unique efficient topology.
(iii) If c > b1 +
(
µ−2
2
)
b2, then null graph is uniquely efficient.
Lemma 4 follows from the analysis of efficient networks by Narayanam and Narahari [12].
The null graph in the proposed model of recursive network formation corresponds to a
single node to which no other node prefers to connect, and so the network does not grow.
Theorem 6 Based on the derived sufficient conditions, null graph, star graph, and complete
graph are efficient.
Proof. It is easy to see that irrespective of the value of c0, if c > b1, no node, external to the
network, connects to the only node in the network and hence, does not enter the network.
Such a network is trivially efficient as in the range c > b1, it is a star of one node and also
a null graph. It is also clear that the star topology and the complete graph are efficient as
the conditions on c from Theorems 1 and 2 form a subset of the range of c in which these
topologies are respectively efficient.
Theorems 7 and 8 give bounds on the efficiency of bipartite Tura´n network and k-star
network, respectively. We provide their proofs in the Appendix.
Theorem 7 Based on the derived sufficient conditions, for µ sufficiently large, efficiency
of bipartite Tura´n network is half of that of the efficient network in the worst case and the
network is close to being efficient in the best case.
Proof. Here, we make a reasonable assumption that the number of nodes in the network is
large. Hence we can assume that µ is even without loss of accuracy. The sum of utilities of
nodes in a bipartite Tura´n network with even number of nodes is
2
(µ
2
)2
(b1 − c) + 2
(µ
2
2
)
2b2
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From Lemma 4, star network is efficient in the range of c derived in Theorem 3. So, to
get the efficiency of the bipartite Tura´n network relative to the star network, we divide the
above sum by the sum of utilities of nodes in a star network, which is
2(µ− 1)(b1 − c) +
(
µ− 1
2
)
2b2 (15)
Using the assumption that µ is large and the fact from the sufficient conditions that b2
is comparable to b1 − c, it can be shown that the efficiency relative to the star network,
approximately is
1
2
+
b1 − c
2b2
As the range of c in Theorem 3 depends on the value of γ, the values of c are bounded by
b1 − b2 and b1 − b3. So the efficiency is bounded by 1 and
(
1
2
+ b3
2b2
)
of that of the star
network, which can take a minimum value of 1
2
of that of star network when b3 << b2.
Theorem 8 Based on the derived sufficient conditions, for µ sufficiently large, efficiency of
k-star network is 1
k
of that of the efficient network in the worst case and the network is close
to being efficient in the best case.
Proof. We make the reasonable assumption of µ being large. In particular, µ >> k (not
necessarily >> k2). Hence we can assume that µ is divisible by k without loss of accuracy.
The sum of utilities of nodes in such a k-star network is
2
(
k
2
)
(b1 − c) + 2(µ− k)(b1 − c) + 2k
(
1−
1
k
)
(µ− k)b2
+2k
(µ
k
− 1
2
)
b2 + k
(µ
k
− 1
)(
1−
1
k
)
(n− k)b3
From Lemma 4, star network is efficient in the range of c derived in Theorems 4 and 5. So,
to get the efficiency of the k-star network relative to the star network, we divide the above
sum by Expression (15). Using the assumption that µ is large and the fact from the sufficient
conditions that b2 and b3 are comparable to b1−c, it can be shown that the efficiency relative
to the star network, approximately is
1
k
+
(
1−
1
k
)
b3
b2
As b3 is bounded by 0 and b2, the efficiency of k-star is bounded by
1
k
and 1 of that of the
star network.
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4 Discussion and Future work
We proposed a model of recursive network formation where nodes enter a network sequen-
tially, thus triggering evolution of the network each time a new node enters. Though we have
assumed a sequential move game model with myopic nodes and pairwise stability as the so-
lution concept, the model, as depicted in Figure 2, is independent of the model of network
evolution, the solution concept used for equilibrium state, and also the utility model. The
recursive nature of our model enabled us to directly analyze the network formation game
using an elegant induction based technique. We derived sufficient conditions by directing
the dynamics of network formation along a desired improving path in the sequential move
game tree.
4.1 Future work
This work proposed a way to derive conditions on cost for maintaining link with an immediate
neighbor and also for entering a network, under which a desired network topology is obtained.
Going a step further, it would be interesting to design incentives such that agents in a network
comply with these conditions. The proposed model of network formation can be extended
to other utility models to investigate the formation of interesting topologies under them.
Our analysis ensures that irrespective of the chosen node at any point in time, the network
evolution is directed as desired. A possible solution for simplifying the analysis for more
involved topologies is to carry out probabilistic analysis for deriving conditions so that a
network has the desired topology with high probability. Another interesting direction, from
a practical viewpoint, is to study the problem of forming networks where the topology need
not be exactly the one which is ideally desirable, for example, a near-k-star network instead
of a precise k-star.
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APPENDIX
Theorem 3. For a network with γ < b2−b3
3b2−b3
, if b1 − b2 + γ (3b2 − b3) < c < b1 − b3 and
(1− γ) (b2 − b3) < c0 ≤ (1− γ) b2, the resulting topology is a bipartite Tura´n graph.
Proof. We first derive conditions for pairwise stability of a bipartite Tura´n network, that is
assuming that such a network is formed, what conditions are required so that there are no
incentives for any two unconnected nodes to create a link between them and for any node
to delete any of its links. Note that these conditions can be integrated in the later part of
the proof within different scenarios that we consider.
In what follows, p1 is the size of the partition constituting the node taking its decision, p2
is the size of the other partition and n = p1 + p2 is the number of nodes in the network.
We need to consider cases for some discretely small number of nodes owing to the nature
of essential nodes, after which the analysis holds for arbitrarily large number of nodes. For
brevity, we present the analysis for the base case and a generic case in each scenario, omitting
presentation of discrete cases.
No two nodes belonging to the same partition should create a link between them:
That is, their utility should not increase by doing so. This is not applicable for n = 2.
For n = 3,
2(b1 − c) ≤ b1 − c+ (1− γ)b2
⇔ c ≥ b1 − b2 + γb2 (16)
For n ≥ 4,
(p2 + 1)(b1 − c) + (p1 − 2)b2 ≤ p2(b1 − c) + (p1 − 1)b2
⇔ c ≥ b1 − b2
which is a weaker condition that Inequality (16).
No node should delete its link with any node belonging to the other partition:
That is, their utility should not increase by doing so.
For n = 2,
0 ≤ b1 − c
⇔ c ≤ b1 (17)
For n ≥ 6,
(p2 − 1)(b1 − c) + (p1 − 1)b2 + b3 ≤ p2(b1 − c) + (p1 − 1)b2
⇔ c ≤ b1 − b3 (18)
It can be shown that conditions for the discrete cases n = 3, 4, 5 are satisfied by Inequal-
ity (18).
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In the process of formation of a bipartite Tura´n network, at most four different types of
nodes exist at any point in time.
I newly entered node
II nodes connected to the newly entered node
III nodes in the same partition as II, but not of Type II
IV rest of the nodes
The notation we use while deriving the sufficient conditions are as follows:
k number of nodes of Type II
n number of nodes in the network, including new node
m1 number of nodes of Types II and III put together
m2 number of nodes of Type IV
For the newly entering node to enter the network: Its utility should be positive after
doing so. Also, in case of even n, for the new node to be a part of the smaller partition, its
first connection should be a node belonging to the larger partition. So for k = 0, we have
For n ≥ 2,
b1 − c+ ⌈
n
2
− 1⌉ ((1− γ)b2 − c0) + ⌊
n
2
− 1⌋(1− γ)b3 > 0
It can be seen that the condition is the strongest when n = 2 whenever
c0 ≤ (1− γ)b2 (19)
The condition thus becomes
c < b1
which is satisfied by Inequality (18).
The utility of a node in the larger partition, whenever applicable, should not
decrease after accepting link from the new node:
For n = 2,
b1 − c ≥ 0
⇔ c ≤ b1
For n ≥ 5,
⌈
n
2
⌉(b1 − c) + ⌊
n
2
− 1⌋b2 + γ⌈
n
2
− 1⌉2b2 + γ⌊
n
2
− 1⌋2b3 ≥ ⌈
n
2
− 1⌉(b1 − c) + ⌊
n
2
− 1⌋b2
⇔ c ≤ b1 + 2γ⌈
n
2
− 1⌉b2 + ⌊
n
2
− 1⌋b3
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The conditions for these as well as the discrete cases n = 3, 4 are satisfied by Inequality (18).
The new node should connect to a node in the larger partition, whenever appli-
cable: One way to see this is by ensuring that this strategy strictly dominates connecting
to a node in the smaller partition. This scenario arises for even values of n ≥ 4.
b1 − c+
(n
2
− 1
)
((1− γ)b2 − c0) +
(n
2
− 1
)
(1− γ)b3
> b1 − c+
(n
2
)
((1− γ)b2 − c0) +
(n
2
− 2
)
(1− γ)b3
⇔ c0 > (1− γ)(b2 − b3) (20)
An alternative condition would be such that the utility of a node in the smaller partition
decreases if it accepts the link from the new node, thus forcing the latter to connect to
a node in the other partition. But it can be seen that this condition is inconsistent with
Inequality (18) and so we use Inequality (20) to meet our purpose.
Type I node should prefer connecting to a Type III node, if any, than remaining
in its current state: For k ≥ 2, this scenario does not arise for n < 6. For n ≥ 6,
(k + 1)(b1 − c) +m2b2 + (m1 − k − 1)b3 > k(b1 − c) +m2b2 + (m1 − k)b3
⇔ c < b1 − b3 (21)
Now for k = 1, this scenario does not arise for n = 2, 3.
For n ≥ 4,
2(b1 − c) +m2b2 + (m1 − 2)b3 > b1 − c+ (1− γ)m2b2 + (1− γ)(m1 − 1)b3
⇔ c < b1 − b3 + γ(m2b2 + (m1 − 1)b3)
Note that as n ≥ 4, we have m1 ≥ 2 and m2 ≥ 1 and so the above condition is weaker that
Inequality (21).
It is also necessary that utility of Type III node does not decrease on accepting link from
Type I node. In fact, when the former gets a chance to move, we derive conditions so that
it also volunteers to create a link with the later.
The utility of Type III node should increase if it successfully creates a link with
Type I node: When k = 1, the case does not arise for n = 2, 3.
For n ≥ 6,
(m2 + 1)(b1 − c) + (m1 − 1)b2 > m2(b1 − c) + (m1 − 1)b2 + (1− γ)b3
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⇔ c < b1 − b3 + γb3
The conditions obtained from discrete cases n = 4, 5 are weaker than this one.
For k ≥ 2, this case does not arise for n < 6.
For n ≥ 6,
(m2 + 1)(b1 − c) + (m1 − 1)b2 > m2(b1 − c) + (m1 − 1)b2 + b3
⇔ c < b1 − b3
The conditions for all cases are satisfied by Inequality (21).
Type III node should not delete its link with Type IV node: This can be assured if
this strategy is dominated by its strategy of forming a link with Type I node. This scenario
does not arise for n = 2, 3. The conditions for the discrete cases n = 4, 5, 6 are weaker than
that for n ≥ 7.
For n ≥ 7,
(m2 + 1)(b1 − c) + (m1 − 1)b2 > (m2 − 1)(b1 − c) + b3 + (m1 − 1)b2 + (1− γ)b3
⇔ c < b1 − b3 +
γ
2
b3
For k ≥ 2, the cases applicable are n ≥ 6. The condition for discrete case n = 6 is weaker
than the following condition.
For n ≥ 7,
(m2 + 1)(b1 − c) + (m1 − 1)b2 > (m2 − 1)(b1 − c) + b3 + b3 + (m1 − 1)b2
⇔ c < b1 − b3
Hence, all conditions for this scenario are satisfied by Inequality (21).
Type III node should prefer connecting to Type I node than to another Type
III node: This does not arise for n < 6. When k = 1,
For n ≥ 6,
(m2 + 1)(b1 − c) + (m1 − 1)b2 > (m2 + 1)(b1 − c) + (m1 − 2)b2 + (1− γ)b3
⇔ b2 > (1− γ)b3
which is always true. For k ≥ 2,
For n ≥ 6,
(m2 + 1)(b1 − c) + (m1 − 1)b2 > (m2 + 1)(b1 − c) + (m1 − 2)b2 + b3
⇔ b2 > b3
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which is always true.
Type IV node should not delete its link with Type III node: That is, its utility
should not increase by doing so. This does not arise for n < 4.
For n ≥ 7,
(m1 − 1)(b1 − c) + (m2 − 1)b2 + (1− γ)b2 + b3 ≤ m1(b1 − c) + (m2 − 1)b2 + (1− γ)b2
⇔ c ≤ b1 − b3
The conditions for discrete cases n = 4, 5, 6 are weaker than the above condition. For k ≥ 2,
the new cases are n ≥ 6, where the discrete case n = 6 result in conditions weaker than the
following one.
For n ≥ 7,
(m1 − 1)(b1 − c) + (m2 − 1)b2 + b2 + b3 ≤ m1(b1 − c) + (m2 − 1)b2 + b2
⇔ c ≤ b1 − b3
It can be seen that all conditions of this scenario are satisfied by Inequality (21).
Type IV node should also not break its link with Type II node: That is, its utility
should not increase by doing so. For k = 1,
For n ≥ 6,
(m1 − 1)(b1 − c) + (m2 − 1)b2 + (1− γ)b4 + (1− γ)b3 ≤ m1(b1 − c) + (m2 − 1)b2 + (1− γ)b2
⇔ c ≤ b1 − b3 + (1− γ)(b2 − b4) + γb3
The discrete cases n = 3, 4, 5 result in weaker conditions than this. For k ≥ 2,
For n ≥ 6,
(m1 − 1)(b1 − c) + (m2 − 1)b2 + b2 + b3 ≤ m1(b1 − c) + (m2 − 1)b2 + b2
⇔ c ≤ b1 − b3
The conditions are satisfied by Inequality (21).
Type I node should not propose a link to a Type IV node: One way is to ensure
that this strategy of Type I node is dominated by its strategy to propose a link to a Type
III node. It can be seen that for k ≥ 2 and n ≥ 6, this translates to
(k + 1)(b1 − c) +m2b2 + (m1 − k − 1)b3 > (k + 1)(b1 − c) + (m2 − 1)b2 + (m1 − k)b2
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⇔ b2 − b3 > (m1 − k)(b2 − b3)
which is not true for m1 > k.
So we look at the alternative condition that the utility of Type IV node decreases if it accepts
the link from Type I node, and as Type I node computes this decrease in utility, it will not
propose a link to Type IV node. First, we consider k = 1. The discrete case n = 4 gives the
following condition.
3(b1 − c) + 2γb2 + 2γb2 < 2(b1 − c) + (1− γ)b2 + 2γb2 + γb3
⇔ c > b1 − b2 + γ(3b2 − b3) (22)
The other discrete cases n = 3, 5 result in weaker conditions than the above.
For n ≥ 6,
(m1 + 1)(b1 − c) + (m2 − 1)b2 < m1(b1 − c) + (m2 − 1)b2 + (1− γ)b2
⇔ c > b1 − b2 + γb2
which is a weaker condition than Inequality (22). Now for k ≥ 2, n = 4, 5 correspond to
pairwise stability conditions and cases n < 4 are not applicable.
For n ≥ 6,
(m1 + 1)(b1 − c) + (m2 − 1)b2 < m1(b1 − c) + (m2 − 1)b2 + b2
⇔ c > b1 − b2
which is satisfied by Inequality (22).
Type IV node should not propose a link to Type I node: This scenario is essentially
equivalent to the previous one scenario of utility of Type IV node decreasing due to link
with Type I node, with the equalities permitted. So these result in weaker and hence no
additional conditions.
Type III node should not propose a link to Type II node: One way is to ensure that
for Type III node, connecting to Type II node is strictly dominated by connecting to Type
I node. It can be seen that for k ≥ 2 and n ≥ 6, this translates to
(m2 + 1)(b1 − c) + (m1 − 2)b2 + b2 < (m2 + 1)(b1 − c) + (m1 − 1)b2
which gives 0 > 0. So we need to use the alternative condition that the utility of Type II
node decreases on accepting link from Type III node. For k = 1,
For n = 4,
3(b1 − c) + 4γb2 < 2(b1 − c) + (1− γ)b2 + 2γb2 + γb3
⇔ c > b1 − b2 + γ(3b2 − b3)
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which is same as Inequality (22).
For n ≥ 5,
(m2 + 2)(b1 − c) + (m1 − 2)b2 + 2γ(m2 + 1)b2 + 2γ(m1 − 2)b3
< (m2 + 1)(b1 − c) + (m1 − 1)b2 + 2γm2b2 + 2γ(m1 − 1)b3
⇔ c > b1 − b2 + 2γ(b2 − b3)
which is a weaker condition than Inequality (22). Now for k ≥ 2, the only new case is the
following.
For n ≥ 6,
(m2 + 2)(b1 − c) + (m1 − 2)b2 < (m2 + 1)(b1 − c) + (m1 − 1)b2
⇔ c > b1 − b2
which is satisfied by Inequality (22).
Type II node should not propose a link with Type III node: This is essentially
equivalent to the above scenario of utility of Type II node decreasing due to link with Type
III node, with the equalities permitted. So these result in weaker and hence no additional
conditions.
No Type II node should delete link with Type IV node: First, we consider k = 1.
For n ≥ 7,
(m2 − 1)(b1 − c) + (b1 − c) + (m1 − 1)b2 + b3 + 2γ(m2 − 1)b2 + 2γ(m1 − 1)b3 + 2γb4
≤ m2(b1 − c) + (b1 − c) + (m1 − 1)b2 + 2γm2b2 + 2γ(m1 − 1)b3
⇔ c ≤ b1 − b3 + 2γ(b2 − b4)
This as well as all discrete cases n < 7 are satisfied by Inequality (21).
For k ≥ 2, the cases of n = 4, 5 correspond to pairwise stability condition that we have
already considered, while cases n < 4 are not applicable.
For n ≥ 6,
m2(b1 − c) + (m1 − 1)b2 + b3 ≤ (m2 + 1)(b1 − c) + (m1 − 1)b2
⇔ c ≤ b1 − b3
which is satisfied by Inequality (21).
Two Type IV nodes should not create a mutual link: That is their utilities should
not increase by doing so. When k = 1, it is not applicable for n < 5. Also, the discrete case
n = 5 results in the same condition as below.
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For n ≥ 6,
(m1 + 1)(b1 − c) + (m2 − 2)b2 + (1− γ)b2 ≤ m1(b1 − c) + (m2 − 1)b2 + (1− γ)b2
⇔ c ≥ b1 − b2
For k ≥ 2, n = 5 corresponds to pairwise stability condition.
For n ≥ 6,
(m1 + 1)(b1 − c) + (m2 − 2)b2 + b2 ≤ m1(b1 − c) + (m2 − 1)b2 + b2
⇔ c ≥ b1 − b2
These are weaker conditions than Inequality (22).
No two Type II nodes should create a link between themselves: This only applies
to k ≥ 2. Also n = 4, 5 result in pairwise stability condition.
For n ≥ 6,
(m2 + 2)(b1 − c) + (m1 − 2)b2 ≤ (m2 + 1)(b1 − c) + (m1 − 1)b2
⇔ c ≥ b1 − b2
which is a weaker condition than Inequality (22).
Link between Type I node and Type II node should not be deleted: It is clear that
it will not be deleted as such a link is just formed with no other changes in the network.
Inequalities (21) and (22) are stronger conditions than Inequalities (16), (17) and (18).
Furthermore, for non-zero range of c, from Inequalities (21) and (22), we have
γ <
b2 − b3
3b2 − b3
(23)
The required sufficient conditions are obtained by combining Inequalities (19), (20), (21),
(22) and (23).
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